Comments

IN RE LYNCH* AND BEYOND TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF SENTENCES

In 1967, John Lynch was convicted of second offense indecent exposure, a felony under California law. The criminal act consisted
of subjecting a waitress at a drive-in restaurant to a brief view of
his penis in the parking lot at 1:30 in the morning. In the words of
the court, this was not a case where an exhibitionist "forced himself on large numbers of the public by cavorting naked on a busy
street at high noon."'1 Nevertheless, for his heinous crime he spent
over five years in California state prisons, including three and one
half years in maximum security at Folsom. 2
Had the California Supreme Court not intervened, Lynch possibly
could have spent the rest of his life in prison for this common law
misdemeanor. Under the California sentencing procedure, the judge
may sentence the defendant to imprisonment in a state prison for
the term prescribed by law.3 It is then the function of the Adult
Authority to determine and redetermine the length of time the person will actually be imprisoned. 4 For the crime of second offense
indecent exposure, a punishment of imprisonment for "not less than

one year ''5 is prescribed. A punishment of imprisonment for not
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972).
Id. at 437, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 503 P.2d at 939.
Id. at 438, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 503 P.2d at 940.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1168 (West 1970).
Id. § 3020.

5. Id. § 314.
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less than a specified number of years with no maximum prescribed
is imprisonment for life, subject to the determination of the Adult
Authority. 6
In In re Lynch 7 the court deemed the defendant's sentence to be
life imprisonment under California Penal Code section 314, and held
that the penalty prescribed in the statute violated the prohibition
of the California Constitution against cruel or unusual punishment8 because it was grossly disproportionate to the offense.0 Using
Lynch as a vehicle, this article will undertake to examine the remedies presently available in California to correct the imposition of an
excessive sentence by the trial judge. The function, procedures
and discretion of the Adult Authority will also be explored, as will
be the feasibility of establishing an abuse of discretion on the
part of the Authority for repeatedly refusing to determine a sentence commensurate with the severity of the crime and the character of the defendant. 10
Contrasted with what turns out to be a rather restrictive policy
in California toward judicial review of excessive sentences, the attitude of courts in other jurisdictions is beginning to change. The activities of several of these jurisdictions, primarily the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the state of Alaska,
will be summarized as illustrations of workable approaches to the
problem of excessive sentences. This article will also touch upon
some possible alternatives to the present policy in California and
suggest factors to be considered in a re-evaluation of California
policy on review of sentences, drawing on the experience of other
jurisdictions.
I. Tim POLICY OF JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
Aside from the cases where the sentence imposed was based in
part on impermissible factors,' the policy of abstaining from the
review of sentences is well established in California. Although a

common sense reading of the California Penal Code would compel
the conclusion that statutory authority exists for appellate review
of sentences, 12 the court, in the first case to construe section 1260
6. Id. § 671.
7. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972).
8. CAL. CoNsT., art. I, § 6.
9. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 439, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 236, 503 P.2d 921,
940 (1972).
10. Id. at 438, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 503 P.2d at 940.
11. E.g. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (sentence based in
part on unconstitutional prior convictions).
12. CAL. Pn. Co § 1260 (West Supp. 1972) states in part:

[voL. 10: 793, 1973]

Comments
SAW DIEGO LAW REVIEW

in substantially its present form held that it was authority to reduce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial only when
there is error relating to the punishment imposed.13 Subsequent
to People v. Odle, the court heard a number of cases involving the
imposition of the death penalty by a jury. In all of these cases, the
language that "(t)his court.. . has no power to substitute its judgment as to choice of penalty for that of the trier of fact" appeared
with monotonous regularity, 14 despite the enactment of Penal
Code section 1181(7) after Odle was decided. 15
Although the policy of non-review is most often encountered in

cases involving the imposition of the death penalty by the jury, it
is not safe to assume that California courts will be willing to review the sentence in cases not involving the action of a jury. In Peo-

ple v. Fusaro,'6 the defendant alleged that the trial judge abused
his discretion in imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences upon defendant's conviction of four narcotics offenses. The
Court of Appeals for the Third District refused to modify the sentence, observing that:
The Legislature . . . permits appellate modification of sentences
only in limited situations. (Citing California Penal Code §§ 1181(7),

1260 and People v. Odle.) Aside from these situations, a reviewing court cannot say that a period of imprisonment within the
limits fixed by statute exceeds the bounds of reason.17
The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgement or order
appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm or modify any or all of

the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgement
or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper,
remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as
may be just under the circumstances. (emphasis added).
13. People v. Odie, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 230 P.2d 345 (1951).

14. For a compilation of cases see People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 455,
78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 670, 455 P.2d 759, 774 (1969) (Peters, J.dissenting).
15.

CAL. PEN. CODE §

1181 (West 1970):

When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against
the defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new
trial in the following cases only:
(7)

When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence,

but in any case wherein authority is vested by statute in the trial
court or jury to recommend or determine as a part of its verdict or
finding the punishment to be imposed, the court may modify such
verdict or finding by imposing the lesser punishment without
granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to

any court to which the case may be appealed.
16. 18 Cal. App. 3d 877, 96 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1971).
17. Id. at 894, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 379.

This restrictive view of the power of appellate courts to redetermine sentences has not gone unopposed. In In re Anderson,18 the
dissent objected to the vesting of absolute discretion to fix the
penalty with the trier of fact, which discretion was not even
subject to review for abuse. A subsequent case involving an
appeal from the imposition of the death penalty by a jury drew two
dissents. 19 In the first, Justice Mosk contended that reduction of
a sentence is clearly a judicial function, and that to hold otherwise
is error.20 Justice Peters was more cautious, contending that Penal Code section 1181 (7) lent itself to the reasonable construction
that the appellate courts have a limited power to impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty in cases where the trier of
21
fact has abused its discretion.

One final case that raised the issue of whether appellate courts
have the power to order a reconsideration of the sentence imposed,

did so in an interesting manner. In People v. Colbert,2" sections of
the Penal Code were amended following defendant's conviction,
making two of the offenses involved felony-misdemeanors rather
than felonies, thus necessitating remand of the case for resentencing on two counts. The defendant contended that the remaining count should also be remanded for reconsideration of the denial of probation. The court refused, not deciding whether it
had the power to do so, despite the Attorney General's suggestion
that Penal Code section 1260 gave the court authority to remand the
23
case for reconsideration of the sentence.
In the federal courts we also start with the proposition that "an
appellate court has no power to modify a sentence. If there is one
rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly established, it
is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is
within the limits allowed by statute. ' 24 However, unlike the California cases, in the federal courts there has been some recent hedging on this heretofore firmly established policy. In United States v.
Daniels,25 a young Jehovah's Witness was convicted of willfully dis18. 69 Cal.2d 613, 643, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 41, 447 P.2d 117, 137 (1968)
(Tobriner, J.concurring).
19. People v. Mabry, 71 Cal.2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 759
(1969).
20. Id. at 449, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 666, 455 P.2d at 770 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
21. Id. at 457, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72, 455 P.2d at 775 (Peters, J. dissenting).
22. 6 Cal. App. 3d 79, 85 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1971).
23. Id. at 85, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 621.

24. United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir. 1952) cert.

denied 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
25. 429 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970).
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obeying an order of his local draft board to report for instructions
to proceed to a state hospital for employment as a conscientious
objector, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but taking judicial notice of the
fact that Jehovah's Witnesses will respond to a court order to perform conscientious objector work but not to an order of the Selective Service Board, it remanded the case for reconsideration of
suspending the five year sentence and granting probation on condition that defendant perform the conscientious objector work.
Upon remand, the District Court refused to reduce or suspend
the sentence and the case made its way back up to the Court of Appeals. 20 Observing that generally the severity or duration of punishment imposed by a trial court is not subject to modification
where the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, the
court held that such a sentence is not wholly immune from judicial
review.2 7 Thus remand for resentencing is proper when, inter
alia, a trial judge has "grossly abused his discretion by failing to
evaluate the relevant information before him .... ,"28 Here, the
relevant information disregarded was the fact that a Jehovah's
Witness may not recognize an order by the Selective Service Board
but may obey an order by the court, and defendant's exemplary past
conduct and good character. The court also expressed concern
with the District Court's inflexible and mechanical sentencing procedure whereby all defendants who refused to obey an order of a

local draft board were given five year sentences.29 In view of its
prior experience with this District Court, the Court of Appeals
did not remand for resentencing, but rather vacated the sentence
and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to impose a
suspended sentence and place defendant on probation provided
he perform the conscientious objector work.
The conclusion that United States v. Daniels marks the beginning
of an expanded federal review of sentences is seductive,3 0 but too
broad a view of this small beginning is not supported by a careful
26. United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
27. Id. at 969.
28. Id. at 971.
29. Id. at 969.
30. See, e.g., Note, Daniels v. United States: Appellate Review of Criminal Sentencing-Limiting the Scope of the Non-Review Doctrine, 33 U.
PiTT.L. REv. 917 (1972).

reading of the case. An important factor in the decision was the district judge's observation that in 30 years on the federal bench he
had, almost without exception, given a five year sentence in cases of
refusal to obey an order of a local draft board.8 1 Thus it is possible to read the case as one in which the sentence was modified
because the trial judge exercised no discretion in imposing sentence
at all.
Indeed, this is the meaning the Fourth Circuit said it attributed to
Daniels when it heard a request for the review of a sentence. In
United States v. Wilson,32 the court was faced with a 23 year old
defendant who was sentenced to three years imprisonment for
forging an endorsement on a $90 United States Treasurer's check.
Baffled by the severity of the sentence in light of defendant's good
reputation and lack of a prior criminal record, the court remanded
the case for reconsideration of sentence on the possibility that the
trial judge had inadvertently overlooked the applicability of the
Youth Corrections Act 33 to defendant's case. 34 This was the articulated reason for remanding the case, despite the fact that earlier
in the proceedings the trial judge had commented on the fact that
defendant was eligible for sentencing under the Act.
The next application of Daniels once again involved a Jehovah's
Witness sentenced to five years imprisonment by the District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky. In United States v. Charles,"
the District Court had distinguished Daniels because here the
young man had only recently converted to the Jehovah's Witness
faith. The Court of Appeals was not convinced, however, and expressed the opinion that by continuing to apply an inflexible standard of sentencing in draft cases, the District Court had abused
its discretion. 36 Observing that the defendant's recent marriage
to a Jehovah's Witness probably had more to do with his recent

conversion than did a desire to avoid the draft, the Court nevertheless felt that this was enough of a difference to call for a remand
for reconsideration of the sentence rather than an instruction as
37
to what the new sentence was to be.
The latest installment in the drama unfolding in the Sixth Circuit once again originated in the Eastern District of Kentucky and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1971).
450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971).
18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026.
United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1971).
460 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1095.
Id.
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involved a series of three cases. In United States v. McKinney, 8
the young defendant was convicted of knowingly refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces and received a sentence of

five years imprisonment.

Finding that there was sufficient evi-

dence to support the conviction, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless was
of the opinion that the 5 year sentence was excessive and out of proportion to the offense in view of defendant's willingness to serve his
country in a noncombatant capacity and his lack of a prior criminal
record. Therefore, the conviction was affirmed but the case remanded for reconsideration of the sentence, the Circuit Court retaining jurisdiction to consider the sentence finally imposed.
Upon remand, the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky once again imposed the maximum five year sentence and the
Sixth Circuit got the case once more. In the meantime, Daniels had
been decided and McKinney was simply remanded for reconsideration in light of that case. 39
This time the District Court not only refused to reduce the sentence, but delivered a commentary on the absolute discretion of the
trial court to impose any sentence he saw fit so long as it did not
exceed the statutory limit, and the lack of jurisdiction of the appellate court to do anything about it. 40 Observing that disparity in
sentencing causes considerable resentment among prison inmates, the Court of Appeals ruled that the maximum sentence imposed in this case constituted a gross abuse of discretion in light of
defendant's good reputation in the community, his lack of a criminal record and the fact that he was married with a small child.
The Court then did do something about it by ordering that the five
year sentence be reduced to one year with credit for time served
and statutory allowances. It also chastised the District Court for
refusing to follow an individual sentencing approach and for vio41
lating an appellate mandate.
What this recent shifting in the attitude of the federal courts
means to the future of appellate review of sentences is not exactly
clear. At the least it indicates a growing fruition of the dissatis-

faction of federal judges with the policy of abstaining from the re38.
39.
40.
41.

427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970).
United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1971).
United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403, 1404 (6th Cir. 1972).
Id.

view of sentences.42 It would also seem clear that there has been
an advance beyond the prior limit of review represented by United
States v. Wiley,4 3 a case where the Seventh Circuit remanded for
resentencing because of the trial judge's announced policy that probation would not be considered for defendants demanding trial.
One is struck by the emphasis placed on the presence of mitigating
factors in the above cases, and particularly in the McKinney
cases. This emphasis lends itself readily to the conclusion that it is
an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to fail to consider miti-

gating circumstances when imposing sentence. In any event, it is
unquestionable that the proposition that an "appellate court has no
control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by
statute '44 is no longer viable in the federal courts.

II

APPEAL FROM THE DETERMI

ATION OF SENTENCE

BY THE ADULT AuTHORITY

When a person is convicted of an offense in California for which
imprisonment in a state prison is prescribed, the sentencing judge
may place the person on probation, grant a new trial, suspend imposition of sentence or sentence the individual to the term prescribed by law.45 If the latter alternative is chosen, it is then the
function of the Adult Authority to determine the duration of the individual's imprisonment. 46 The Adult Authority may not, of
course, determine a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, 47 but short of this limitation, its discretion is virtually unassailable. The courts have found that once sentenced, a prisoner
has no "vested right to serve less than the maximum term for which
he was sentenced" and no right to have his case determined in a
particular way.48 Thus the discretion lodged in the authority is so
broad that "it is seldom that a case can be made out that would
show an abuse of that discretion." 49
42. See, e.g., Frankel, Lawlessness In Sentencing, 41 U. CiN. L. REv. 1
(1972).
43. 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). This case was relied upon heavily by
the Daniels court, possibly because it was the only precedent it had, and
possibly because it too involved an inflexible sentencing policy.
44. United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir. 1952) cert.
denied 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
45. Note, The California Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing
and the Parole Decision as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5
U.C.D.L. REv. 360 (1972).
46. CAL. PEN. CODE § 3020 (West 1970).
47. Id. § 3023.
48. Azeria v. Cal. Adult Authority, 193 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-5, 13 Cal. Rptr.
839, 841-42 (1961).

49. Id. at 5, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 842. By using the word "seldom" the court
understated the situation, as a careful search of the cases has failed to turn
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Nor is the procedure followed by the Adult Authority more vulnerable to attack in the courts. It has been held that there is no
right to counsel at 50Adult Authority proceedings to fix or redetermine the sentence.
Other procedural niceties, such as access to
the information relied upon by the Authority in fixing the sentence and a written record of the proceedings, are also not required
at Adult Authority hearings. 51 As late as 1971, when the California Supreme Court refused to apply Mempa v. Rhay to parole
revocation hearings, the court stated .that "due process only requires that the Adult Authority discharge its responsibilities in good
faith, neither arbitrarily nor capriciously.. .,52 and also refused to
rule on the validity of the factors considered by the Adult Authority. However, even arbitrary or capricious action on the part of
the authority would be extremely difficult to demonstrate. There
are no formal criteria for the determination of sentences, only the
briefest of notes make up the "record" and the determinations are
unilateral affairs, usually the decision of one member of a panel.5"
One recent development in this area of the law has been the overruling of In re Tucker by the United States Supreme Court in
Morrissey v. Brewer,54 which held that parole revocation hearings
put at stake a person's liberty and therefore a little bit of due process was required at two stages of the proceeding. After the arrest
of the parolee, a reasonably prompt informal inquiry must be made
by an impartial officer to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person has violated his parole. The parolee
must be given prior notice of the alleged violations and be permitted to produce information and question adverse witnesses. At
the revocation hearing itself, the parolee must be given written notice of the violations, the evidence against him must be disclosed,
he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses in his behalf, he must be given the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, the hearing must be before a neuup a single instance where an abuse of discretion by the authority has
been found.
50. People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390
(1970).
51. Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 486 P.2d 657 (1971).
53. Note, supra note 45, at 372-75.
54. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

tral and detached hearing body, and a written statement must be
prepared detailing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for
revoking parole. 55 The right to counsel at parole revocation hearings was not reached by the Court.
It is again tempting to conclude from Morrissey v. Brewer that
the due process procedural requirements set out in that case will
now be applicable to sentence determination and redetermination
hearings conducted by the Authority. However, it is submitted that
such a broad application of Morrissey would not be compelled by
the opinion of the Court. The parolee's release gave him a sufficient stake in his liberty that its termination required that he be
given due process. 56 Thus it will not necessarily be extended to
cover situations in which the prisoner "has no vested right to serve
57
less than the maximum term for which he was sentenced."
There is a good argument, however, that the Morrissey due process requirements might extend to hearings conducted to redetermine the sentence of a prisoner. Indeed, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California seemed to be heading
in this direction in Hester v. Craven,58 where it held that the
Authority had violated the defendant's right to due process when
it redetermined his sentence on the basis of factual events which occurred outside of prison while he was on parole, without giving
him the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. 0 The
holding was based on the rationale that once the prisoner's sentence was determined, he had a right to have it terminate on that
date, and if the Authority was to redetermine the sentence, the
prisoner's right was sufficient that he must be given due process

before he could be deprived of it.
III.

APPEAL OF SENTENCE-CRUEL OR
UNUSUAL PUNISHNENT

Thus it appears that in contending that his sentence for not less
than one year was cruel or unusual punishment, John Lynch was
using the only avenue available in California to contest the excessiveness of his sentence. However, even in this area a survey of
the cases does not leave one with a feeling of optimism about the
future treatment of excessive sentences. Here too the analysis be55. Id. at 485-89.
56. Id. at 482.
57. Azeria v. Cal. Adult Authority, 193 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-5, 13 Cal. Rptr.
839, 841-42 (1961).
58. 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
59. Id. at 1265.
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gins with a presumption that a sentence within the limits of a valid
statute is not generally cruel or unusual.6 0 There is also a reluctance to interfere with the legislative determination of what constitutes a proper punishment, and the courts will uphold a statute
unless its "unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably
appears." 61 Nor is there any doubt as to the constitutionality of
62
the indeterminate sentence law.
In re Lynch 3 was the first case in which a California court has
held that a punishment was unconstitutional because it was disproportionate to the offense.6 4 Relying on numerous decisions in the
federal courts and other states,6 5 the court enumerated three techniques used to determine if a punishment is so disproportionate
to the crime that it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. First,
the nature of the offense and the offender is examined to determine
the degree of danger which both present to society. Thus if the
offense is minor, or nonviolent, or is committed in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, a less severe punishment is called for.
Second, if the punishment imposed for the offense in question is
more severe than that imposed for similar or more severe crimes in
the same jurisdiction, then it becomes suspect. The third method
of analysis is to compare the punishment prescribed with that imposed by other jurisdictions for the same offense. 66 The court then
measured the facts in Lynch against these three analytical tech60. People v. Keller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 711, 54 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1966) (life
sentence for selling marijuana not cruel or unusual).
61. In re Dennis, 70 Cal. 2d 444, 453, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6, 450 P.2d 296,
301 (1969).
62. People v. Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 927, 72 Cal .Rptr. 538 (1968).
63. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972).
64. Id. at 420, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223, 503 P.2d at 927. See also Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAw. L. REV. 838, 853-54 (1972) for the proposition that

proportionality is the principle underlying the 8th Amendment, and that it
has been so since the inception of the amendment.
65. See, e.g., People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972)

(mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years for selling marijuana so severe
as to be cruel or unusual punishment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 377 (1910) (sentence of 12 years at hard and painful labor, together
with loss of civil rights and official surveillance for life, for the crime of
making two false entries in a government cash book was cruel in its excess and unusual in its character).
66. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 425-29, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226-29, 503

P.2d 921, 930-33 (1972).

niques, and found that the punishment was disproportionate to the
offense for all three reasons.
Turning first to the nature of the offense, it was noted that indecent exposure at common law was merely a public nuisance, punishable as a misdemeanor. Correspondingly, the offense was a misdemeanor in California for 80 years, until the enactment of the
present penalty in 1952. The court also observed that the offense
never entails physical aggression or contact with the "victim", and
in fact the exhibitionist fears such contact. In short, the act of
exposure would seem to be the product of insecurity and low selfesteem, triggered frequently by frustrations of daily life rather
than by aggressive intent. Finally, the court pointed to the fact
that, although the crime is not exactly a victimless one, the harm
61
caused is minimal embarrassment or annoyance.
The penalty involved fared no better when subjected to the second technique of analysis. When compared with the punishments
prescribed for other crimes in California of far greater seriousness,
the life sentence imposed on Lynch for second offense indecent
exposure stands out as an anomaly. Among the more striking examples used by the court are: manslaughter (up to 15 years);
assault with intent to commit murder (1-14 years); assault on a
peace officer in the performance of his duties (up to 2 years); assault with intent to commit rape (1-20 years); inflicting on a child
any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a
traumatic condition (up to 10 years).68 Likewise, when the statutes prescribing enhanced punishment for recidivism were examined it was discovered that:
(A) man may repeatedly commit manslaughter or mayhem, assault
with intent to commit rape or sodomy, child-beating or felony
drunk driving, and still be subject each time to a lighter penalty
than one who twice exposes his private parts.0 9

Turning to the last technique, the court found that 34 states and
the District of Columbia do not increase the punishment for re-

peated offenses, but treat each offense as a misdemeanor. Of those
states which do enhance the punishment for second or subsequent
offenses of indecent exposure, only two approach the life maximum
imposed in California, with most of the remainder prescribing a
short jail sentence or a small fine.7 0
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

429-31, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 229-31, 503 P.2d at 933-35.
431-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32, 503 P.2d at 935-36.
434, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233, 503 P.2d at 937.
436-37, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35, 503 P.2d at 938-39.
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IV.

STATUTORY REVIEw OF SENTENCES:

THE EXPERIENCE

IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Presently at least sixteen jurisdictions have statutes which allow appellate review of sentences. 71 Of these states, Alaska, Illinois and Oklahoma have been extremely active in reviewing sentences alleged to be excessive. The Alaska review statute and the
cases decided thereunder will be examined herein as an example

of a modern approach to the review of sentences.
Effective January 1, 1970, the state of Alaska provided for ap-

pellate review of sentences as follows:
(a) A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the superior
court for a term or for aggregate terms exceeding one year may be
appealed to the supreme court by the defendant on the ground that
the sentence is excessive. By appealing a sentence under this section, the defendant waives the right to plead that by a revision of
the sentence resulting from the appeal he has been twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense.
(b) A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the superior
court may be appealed to the supreme court by the state on the
ground that the sentence is too lenient; however, when a sentence
is appealed by the state and the defendant has not appealed the sentence, the court is not authorized to increase the sentence but
may express its approval or disapproval of the sentence and its reasons in a written opinion.... 72

In the first case to arise under the new statute,73 the court ac-

knowledged a "duty to examine the proceedings below to review for
excessiveness or leniency the sentence imposed by the trial court,
in light of the nature of the crime, the defendant's character, and
the need for protecting the public. 7' 4 It also recognized that the

statute relied on the objectives of sentence review expressed in
the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences:
(i)to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender,
and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording
71. The statutes are gathered in the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sen-

tences, Appendix A.

(Approved Draft, 1968) (hereinafter cited as ABA

Standards).
72. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1969).
73. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).

74. Id. at 443.

him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding
his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for
sentencing which are both rational and just.75

Somewhat repetitiously, other goals within the standards were
found to be rehabilitation, isolation of the offender, deterrence of
the offender and others from future crimes of a like nature, and
maintaining respect for societal norms3 0
In applying these standards to the case in question, an appeal by
the state on the ground that the imposition of three concurrent
terms of one year for convictions on two counts of forcible rape
and one count of robbery was too lenient, the Court expressed its
opinion that a substantially longer period of incarceration on each
count would have served to emphasize society's condemnation of
forcible rape, brought home to the defendant the seriousness of his
crime, and given the Division of Corrections better opportunity to
determine whether defendant required any special treatment. The
minimal sentence in this case also contributed to the
problem of
disparity in sentences throughout the state.
In subsequent cases, and they are numerous, the standards set
out in Chaney have begun to emerge with admirable clarity and
consistency. One of the first principles to be followed is that the
statutory maximum for a particular crime is the expression of a legislative judgment about how the worst offenders within the class
should be treated. 77 In line with this principle, drug offenses are
put into four classes of descending seriousness: smuggling or sale
of large amounts of narcotics; smuggling or sale of small amounts
of narcotics; possession; and marijuana offenses. 78
However, this standard is not inflexible and the Court has been
reluctant to modify the imposition of the statutory maximum on
persons other than the worst type of offender within the prescribed class, if aggravating factors are present. Likewise, if the
trial court has not strictly complied with the four classifications

of drug offenses when imposing sentence, the sentence will not be
modified if it was based on other proper considerations.

Thus if

75. ABA Standards, supra note 71, Standard 1.2.
76. State v. Chancy, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
77. Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199 (Alaska 1971); Galaktionoff v. State,
486 P.2d 919 (Alaska, 1971); Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska, 1971).
78. Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199 (Alaska, 1971); Meyers v. State, 488
P.2d 713 (Alaska, 1971); Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska, 1971); Wright
v. State, 501 P.2d 1360 (Alaska, 1972).
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the defendant has demonstrated a propensity for criminal activity,79 or a sporadic employment record,8 0 or a lack of interest in rehabilitation, 8 ' or if a psychiatric report has indicated that he is likely
to engage in further anti-social behavior,8 2 then a more severe sentence will not be modified. Along these same lines, the Court has
tended to affirm severe sentences if the criminal behavior in

question involved death or great danger to the personal safety of
others, 8 3 or if the legislature has decided that a class of offenses is
particularly serious.8 4
Of particular interest to the present inquiry are the standards that
the Court established in those cases where the sentence was found to
be excessive. Of primary importance is the theory of proportionality that is inherent in the concept of reserving the statutory maximum for the worst type of offenders. This was the standard
applied in Galaktionoff v. State8" where the Court modified a maximum sentence of one year and reduced it to six months in the case

of a defendant convicted of petty larceny for stealing a half gallon
of sherbet and two packages of cigarettes. Of equal significance
was the Court's recognition that the maxim that the trial judge is
in the best position to evaluate the crime and the defendant is of lit79. Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199 (Alaska, 1971) (prior sale of heroin
while on probation, robbery while awaiting trial, prior record); Peterson
v. State, 487 P.2d 682 (Alaska, 1971) (Prior record); Johnston v. State,
489 P.2d 134 (Alaska, 1971) (same); Griggs v. State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska,
1972) (7 prior convictions); Gullard v. State, 497 P.2d 93 (Alaska, 1972)
(2 subsequent convictions for similar offense); Hawthorne v. State, 501 P.2d
155 (Alaska, 1972) (a "considerable" criminal record); Gordon v. State, 501
P.2d 772 (Alaska, 1972) (2 prior convictions).
80. Peterson v. State, 487 P.2d 632 (Alaska, 1971) (erratic job record);
Meyers v. State, 488 P.2d 713 (Alaska, 1971) (same); Tarnef v. State,
492 P.2d 109 (Alaska, 1971) (poor service record and history of unemployment).
81. Meyers v. State, 488 P.2d 713 (Alaska, 1971); Gregory v. State, 492

P.2d 108 (Alaska, 1971); Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska, 1971); Gordon v. State, 501 P.2d 772 (Alaska, 1972).
82. Condon v. State, 498 P.2d 276 (Alaska, 1972).
83. Gray v. State, 487 P.2d 680 (Alaska, 1971) (life sentence for felonymurder); Johnston v. State, 489 P.2d 134 (Alaska, 1971) (8 years, with 3 suspended for beating and robbing a cab driver); Gregory v. State, 492 P.2d
108 (Alaska, 1971) (7 years with 3 suspended for manslaughter by stabbing); Condon v. State, 498 P.2d 276 (Alaska, 1972) (20 years for 2d degree
murder).
84. Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360 (Alaska, 1972) (6 years for selling
LSD not excessive in view of 25 year and/or $20,000 maximum).
85. 486 P.2d 919 (Alaska, 1971).

tle real significance where a guilty plea has been entered without
a trial.
The articulated goal in sentencing of the rehabilitation of the offender was highlighted in another case.

In Mattern v. State80

a twenty six year old man was convicted of burglary for entering an unoccupied apartment and taking some items of woman's under clothing, ignoring the valuables that were present. In deciding that the eighteen month sentence imposed was too severe, the
court said that in view of defendant's age, his good reputation in
the community, his excellent job record, and particularly the presentence report which indicated that he could benefit from treatment if placed on probation, the twin goals of rehabilitation of the
offender and the protection of the public could best be served if
defendant were placed on probation and underwent a regular
program of treatment.
The goal of rehabilitation has cropped up in other contexts as
well. In Gullard v. State8 7 the Court affirmed a ten year sentence
imposed for vehicular manslaughter but vacated that part of the
sentence calling for service of one-third of the sentence without
possibility of parole. It felt that because defendant was nineteen
years old and the maximum sentence was a long one, the parole
board could best determine defendant's eligibility for parole. However, the Court has also upheld a ten year sentence, one third without the possibility of parole, when the trial court has made a reasoned decision that rehabilitation is unlikely at best.8s
As indicated earlier in this discussion of the Alaska experiment,
the State was also given the option to appeal a sentence on the
ground that it is too lenient. This power is, of course, consistent
with the goal of "....

promot(ing) the development and applica-

80
tion of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and Just."1
The idea was to achieve a more balanced picture of the evolving
sentencing standards in the state. To date, the State has appealed
three cases on the ground that the sentence was too lenient, and
"won" 90 two. The first, State v. Chaney,91 has already been discussed in relation to the articulated goals of sentence review. In

that case, the wisdom of providing the state with the power to ap86. 500 P.2d 228 (Alaska, 1972).
87. 497 P.2d 93 (Alaska, 1972).
88. Gordon v. State, 501 P.2d 772 (Alaska, 1972).
89. ABA Standards, supra note 71, Standard 1.2 (iv).
90. Of course the sentence cannot be increased unless the defendant has
also appealed on the ground that the sentence is excessive. ALASKA STAT.
§12.55.120 (b).
91. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska, 1971). See text at note 73, supra.
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peal lenient sentences appears, because it is in appeals by the state
that the goals of maintaining respect for society's norms (punishment?) and deterring the offender and others from future criminal
conduct stand out. For example, in the next case appealed by the
State,92 the Court found that a sentence of three years probation
imposed on a defendant who assaulted his victim with a tire
iron and left him for dead in an isolated area was too lenient because
a stretch in jail would have brought home to the defendant the
seriousness of his crime. In the third such case, however, the Court
held that a three year suspended sentence and probation was not
too lenient a sentence for the crime of manslaughter in view of the
"extraordinary circumstances" surrounding the crime, 93 once again
demonstrating the admirable flexibility of its sentencing standards.
Two final observations are in order as to appellate review of
sentences in Alaska. The first is that it is improper to base the
sentence, even in part, on purported "contacts" with the police not
resulting in conviction. This situation first presented itself in Peterson v. State9" and the Court cautioned against relying on such

"contacts" as a basis for sentence. Subsequently, the Court warned
that undue emphasis in a proper case upon such "contacts" could
call for remand for resentencing, although in the case before it
the defendant's seven prior convictions were sufficient police
contacts that the D.A.'s reference to thirty-eight arrests was not
prejudicial. 96 And likewise the fact that the record discloses that
the defendant might have been charged with a more serious offense
is not a proper basis for a more severe sentence.9 6
The final observation is one that is so obvious that it was nearly
overlooked. In order for the review of the sentence to be meaningful in any real sense, it is necessary that the appellate court have
before it the presentence report and the trial judge's reasons for
the imposition of the sentence chosen.9 7 Thus, predictably, the
Supreme Court Rules require that the trial judge articulate his reasons for the imposition of sentence.9 8
92.
93.
what
94.
95.
96.
97.

State v. Armantrout, 483 P.2d 696 (Alaska, 1971).
State v. Howey, 495 P.2d 1270 (Alaska, 1972).
the "extraordinary circumstances" are, however.
487 P.2d 682 (Alaska, 1971).
Griggs v. State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska, 1972).
Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 919 (Alaska, 1971).
ABA Standards, supra note 71, Standard 2.3.

98. ALASKA SUP. CT. R. 21(f).

We are not told

In summary it would appear that we have in the Alaska experiment a rather innovative and apparently successful workshop in
the principles of modern appellate review of sentences. The ABA
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences are manifestly
relied upon in applying sentencing standards, with the deviations
becoming insignificant in the overall context. Thus Alaska would
seem to offer a wealth of experience from which to draw when considering a workable review procedure for California. With the
possible exception of Illinois, which relies on a threefold objective
of sentencing as being: to provide adequate punishment for the offense, to safeguard society, and to rehabilitate the offender, and
also considers similar factors as Alaska when imposing individual
sentences,9 9 Alaska appears to be the only state where coherent
standards for sentencing are being imposed statewide. It has the
added advantage of having decided a manageable number of cases
for purposes of analysis.
V.

Juimuc

REVIEW OF SENTENCES
m CALIORmA

In reading the disclaimers by the California appellate courts of

any "power to substitute its judgment as to choice of penalty for
that of the trier of fact,"'10 0 one wonders if the justices are not being
too modest. The federal courts, after all, have begun to rebel
against this narrow policy, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has reviewed sentences on the ground of excessiveness in a
prolific number of cases, on no more authority than a general review
statute worded in much the same manner as California Penal Code

section 1260.101 Admittedly though, the Oklahoma justices are modest also, having power to modify a sentence only if it is "so excessive
as to shock the conscience of the court,"'10 2 seemingly language indicating cruel or unusual punishment. However, a survey of the
digests reveals that the conscience of the court has been shocked
what appears to be hundreds of times.
Somehow, one is reminded of the time Tom Sawyer and Huck
Finn set out to release Jim from the cabin where he was being held
captive. Tom had read the authorities and knew that the only
proper way to dig out of prison was to use a case knife. Consequently, he would have nothing to do with Huck's suggestion that
picks would be the more appropriate tools. After a long session
99. See, e.g., People v. Odom, 8 I. App. 3d 227, 289 N.E.2d 663 (1972).
100. See note 14, supra.
101. OKiA. STAT. ANx., tit. 22, § 1066: "The appellate court may re"
verse, affirm or modify the judgement appealed from ....
102. Stidham v. State, 503 P.2d 905, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
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with the knives, it became apparent that they were not equal to the
task. After studying on it, Tom came up with a solution that
would get the job done without offending the authorities. "Gimme
a case knife," he said. As Huck tells it:
He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it
down, and says:

'Gimme a case knife?
I didn't know just what to do-but then I thought. I scratched
around amongst the old tools, and got a pickax and give it to him,
and he took it and went to work, and never said a word.
He was always just that particular. Full of principle. 103

What is being suggested is simple. In holding that the punishment imposed upon Lynch was cruel or unusual, the California
Supreme Court relied upon the concept of proportionality upon
which the Alaska review statute is based. There is also more than
a passing similarity between the factors examined by the court
in Lynch and those which were deciding in the Sixth Circuit draft
cases and in the cases decided under the Alaska statute. Indeed,
there is little doubt as what the result in Lynch would have been
had the Alaska Supreme Court heard the case. The court would
have taken notice of the nonviolent nature of the offense, the
complete lack of aggravating factors in this particular offense, the
pleasant personality and the great potential of the defendant, 104
the likelihood that defendant could benefit from treatment away
from penal environs, and the fact that such an excessive sentence
contributes to the disparity in sentences throughout the state, and
then would have found the sentence excessive. Of course, these
were precisely the factors relied upon by the California court, along
with its comparison with the penalties imposed in other states, for
its decision that Lynch's punishment was cruel or unusual. Is it possible that the California Supreme Court took a lesson from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, and struck down a sentence that was

merely excessive, calling it "cruel or unusual punishment" only

because the authorities (here, the court itself) have held that excessiveness is not sufficient grounds to review a sentence?
It is recognized that this suggestion is not entirely fair. It was

103. MARx TwAN, THE ADVENTURES OF HucKIEBEY FiNN, 239-240 (New
American Library, 1959).
104. The California Supreme Court also took notice of the fact that
the punishment did not fit the offender, In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 437,
105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 235, 503 P.2d 921, 939 (1972).

not the sentence imposed by the trial judge which was examined
at all, but rather the statutory penalty. Furthermore, it was the
action of the Adult Authority in four times refusing to fix Lynch's
sentence at less than ]ife' 0 5 that resulted in his excessive incarceration. However, in a very real sense it was the action of the Adult
Authority which was reviewed because the cruel or unusual punishment issue would never have arisen but for its inaction. This fact
did not escape the notice of the court, for it commented on "the vast
disproportion between the conduct of which petitioner was
convicted and the punishment he has suffered," although it found
it unnecessary to reach petitioner's claim that the Authority deprived him of due process by repeatedly denying him parole. 10
The problem with the holding in In re Lynch is that a decision
that life imprisonment for second offense indecent exposure is cruel
or unusual punishment does not promise to be of much utility to
others who have been unreasonably denied release by the Adult
Authority. It is recognized that until the scope of the problem of
excessive prison terms is determined in California, any suggested
solutions would be premature. Therefore, it is submitted that a legislative investigation is in order to take inventory of those persons warehoused in California penal institutions for unreasonable
periods of time. Depending, then, on the results of the inventory,
the following recommendations merit consideration.
It has been suggested that in a very real sense, the determination of sentence by the Adult Authority is the sentencing process.10 7 If one accepts this observation as sound, then all the reasons for extending due process and the right to counsel to the imposition of sentence under Mempa v. Rhay'08 and the revocation of
parole under Morrissey v. Brewer'0 9 pertain with equal force to
sentence determination hearings. Thus it has been recommended
that prisoners be given access to the information relied upon by
the Authority in determining sentence, that a detailed record of
the proceedings be required listing the reason for the decision and
the factors considered, and that the right to counsel be extended
to sentence determination hearings. 1 0
105. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 438, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 236, 503 P.2d 921, 940 (1972).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Sturm v. Cal. Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1968) (Brown-

ing, J. concurring).

108. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
109. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
110. Note, The California Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing
and the Parole Decision as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5
U.C.D.L. REv. 360, 377-81 (1972).
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Judge Frankel has advanced the suggestion that precise factors
in mitigation and aggravation of sentence be defined and codified
to govern the sentencing process."' This suggestion could easily
be applied to the proceedings of the Adult Authority, and the factors themselves might be taken from the cases decided by the Sixth
Circuit and the Supreme Court of Alaska. This development would
not only serve to guide the Adult Authority in its exercise of discretion, but would in turn provide criteria for judicial review of its
determinations. This extended judicial review, in turn, would not
seem to be a radical development, as the courts already review sen112
tences based in part on impermissible factors.
Finally, if the suggested inventory of California penal institutions reveals widespread abuse, it is suggested that the indeterminate sentencing concept itself be reconsidered. The theory of
the indeterminate sentence law is that it permits the shortening
of the defendant's sentence if he has been rehabilitated.118 However, Judge Frankel has pointed out some basic fallacies in the
theory which have resulted in cruelty and injustice rather than rehabilitation." 4 First, many offenders neither need nor respond to
any form of rehabilitation and thus their sentences can logically
be based only upon the objectives of deterrence and societal condemnation-objectives which do not call for consideration at a time
later than trial. Second, with the possible exceptions of the drug
offenders, the juveniles and the mentally ill, the goal of rehabilitation is a forlorn hope at best. And third, the resentment generated
among prisoners by the indeterminate sentences very likely outweighs any benefits. 1 5 Thus it is suggested that the indeterminate sentence be reserved only for those types of offenders which
we have some hope of rehabilitating.
STEVE SCHROEDER

111. Frankel, Lawlessness In Sentencing, 41 U. Cnu. L. REV. 1, 45-46
(1972).
112. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
113. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 416, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220, 503 P.2d 921,

924 (1972).

114. Frankel, supra note 110, at 31.
115. Id. at 31-39.

